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Much of the prior research on white power groups focuses on very rare outcomes – 
criminal events, especially violent ones – without as much attention devoted to the more 
common or fundamental activities that often work to start the mobilization process for 
ethnocentric groups and the individuals associated with them.  Broadly, the goal of the current 
study is to fill this gap in knowledge by integrating prominent criminological theories and 
themes drawn from the social movement literature in order to explore the geographic distribution 
and macro-level correlates of ideologically-motivated white power movement activities.  
Specifically, I implement content analysis techniques of open source and news media materials 
that geo-locate a wide variety of different white power events expected to signify support and/or 
mobilization (e.g., rallies), which I then aggregate and pair with demographic and structural 
measures drawn from the United States Census’s American Communities Survey.  The nation-
level results indicate that white power organizations target traditionally conservative and 
financially well-off medium sized towns that have relatively small foreign-born populations.  
The nation-level results are tempered by the wide variability found in the regional models, 
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Amidst the backdrop of global diversification stemming from both immigration and 
domestic migration, far-right groups in the United States have proliferated since the election of 
Barack Obama in 2008 (SPLC Hatewatch 2012), just as far-right, fiercely nationalistic parties in 
Europe have increased since the 1990’s (Veugelers 1997, Taylor et al 2013: 65). Yet, despite 
such growth, there remains a relative lack of academic insight on contemporary racist, 
ethnocentric social movements (Blee 2002, Brustein 1996, Futrell & Simi 2004, McVeigh 1999). 
Historically, such movements received a substantial amount of coverage, with both the Third 
Reich and the varying incarnations of the Ku Klux Klan each seeing their own day in the 
academic spotlight. But as the prevailing cultural ethos has become more pronouncedly 
integrationalist and multicultural, ethnocentric movements are often treated as cultural 
throwbacks that do not warrant sociological understanding (Futrell & Simi 2004). While such 
stigma is understandable, leaving ethnocentric social movements untouched leaves a gap in 
sociological knowledge that has yet to be adequately addressed. 
 In contrast, ethnocentric political thought is far from being a historical artifact, although 
the issue remains whether such contemporary ethnocentric movements can be adequately 
understood through the lens of prior empirical studies. To that effect, the current study explores 
the social environment of the contemporary white power1 movement in the United States. 
Specifically, I ask two interrelated questions: (1) How are white power movement support events 
                                                 
1 I use the terms “white supremacist” and “white power” interchangeably throughout the 
manuscript. Though there remains debate surrounding this terminology that cannot be settled 
here (e.g., white power” is most often used in discussing a social movement, while “white 
supremacist” is typically used in criminological contexts), the common theme shared among 
both groups is the belief that individuals of the white race are superior to those of all other races 
and should wield all social, economic, and political power. 
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geographically distributed? and (2) What are the macro-structural correlates of white power 
movement support events? 
 I direct the focus of this study towards the contemporary white power movement for 
several reasons. First, white power is the most historically salient form of ethnocentrism the 
United States can offer. The arc of American history can largely be mapped by the struggles over 
the issue of race, including such historically contentious issues as the debate over federal and 
state’s rights in the form of race-based slavery, public education amidst racial segregation, and 
social welfare policy in the context of stratified poverty (Bonilla-Silva 2003). Second, the white 
power movement still exists despite its historical setbacks. This continuity allows the ability to 
inform my study from previous examinations of American white power while also allowing an 
understanding of white power in its contemporary and modern form. 
 The current study unfolds by, first, providing an overview of the social movements 
literature with an emphasis on the prominent gaps in knowledge regarding conservative 
movements. Second, a general overview of the hate crime literature is given with a particular 
focus on under-examined themes, including social movements, the radicalization process 
involved in hate crime, and the importance of location or context. Third, a review of sociological 
and criminological theoretical frameworks will be outlined that provide expectations for where 
(and why) white power groups should hold movement support events. Fourth, a walkthrough of 
the methods and statistical procedures and, finally, I outline the parameters of the current study, 
including data, methods, and results, followed by a discussion of the implication for the current 







The study of social movements has undergone a complex evolution in the way social 
scientists attempt to understand why people organize together to achieve collective action. Early 
conceptualizations of social movements were largely informed by the historical experiences of 
World War II with an emphasis on the supposed irrationality and mass hysteria of movement 
participants that contributed to the rise of National Socialism in Germany (Brustein 1998) and 
the National Fascists in Italy (Brustein 1991). By emphasizing the fear mongering and hysteria 
of 1920’s Germany and Italy, early social movement scholars suggested that people were willing 
to embrace both movements during times of severe unemployment as a result of emotional 
decisions that lacked inherent rationality (Jenkins 1983; Brustein 1998). That is, it was heavily 
suggested by early scholars of fascist movements that there could not possibly be a rational 
motive to join such groups. 
 Subsequently, the Civil Rights movement led social movement scholars to question the 
established emotional explanations for movement participation. The Civil Rights movement 
reoriented social movement research towards a more rational and nuanced approach that, in turn, 
has come to dominate by the study of similarly progressive movements. Perhaps due to the more 
agreeable positions of the Civil Rights movement (and others like it) during the 1960’s 
(McVeigh 1999), scholars began to emphasize the logic of movement participants and their 
responses to societal support and constraint as they sought to accumulate adherents and resources 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). Societal grievances were seen as constants and, by extension, 
secondary factors in the formation of social movements (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 
1977). Instead, new emphasis was placed on entrepreneurs seizing on major interest cleavages 
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and mobilizing the accumulation of resources needed for the collective action required to address 
them (Jenkins 1983). 
 A critical point to take away from this historical shift in the movement literature is that 
the success of a given effort is dependent on its ability to accumulate enough resources to 
achieve its desired goals (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977). The deciding factor of 
movement success is, thus, how well the movement frames the conflict of interest at hand: how it 
aligns its own goals, ideology, and activities with the interests, values, and beliefs of the target 
audience (Snow et al 1986). McVeigh (1999), for example, demonstrates that the Indiana Klu 
Klux Klan (KKK) of the 1920’s framed societal grievances in the Klan’s effort to mobilize 
support in pursuance of the Klan’s goals by appealing to the white, Protestant middle-class. By 
articulating the impending threat that both large-scale manufacturing and increased farm tenancy 
posed on middle-class economic well-being, as well as the growing cultural threat posed by non-
whites and non-Protestants, the large pool of members and resources allowed the Indiana Klan to 
effectively impact presidential elections and federal legislative policy (McVeigh et al 2004).  
More central to the current study, a host of macro-structural studies similarly focuses on 
how various social movements frame their cause, while also identifying the contextual 
conditions under which a given frame might seem most attractive. Certainly, how a movement 
group couches its goals and identity can encourage support of a particular demographic subgroup 
at the expense of another, giving movement support observable patterns (Snow et al 1984; 
McVeigh et al 2004). McVeigh’s study of Klan frames (1999) incorporates a geospatial 
component to examine which specific areas of Indiana prove to be most receptive of Klan 
rhetoric, as Klan support is not evenly distributed. Rather, McVeigh finds that the Indiana 
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counties most at risk of increased immigration, large manufacturing, and increased farm tenancy 
had significantly larger Klan membership rates as compared to counties without such conditions.   
This demography-oriented approach to the study of social movements has a comfortable 
niche in the movements literature, as it helps compliment the qualitative studies of movement 
formation that typically dominates the field. The sociological understanding of fascism, for 
example, has been greatly enhanced by the demographic study of several fascist movements and 
their structural correlates. Locating the structural correlates of the Nazi movement, for example, 
challenges conventional arguments on the role of the mass hysteria on the rise of National 
Socialism in 1930’s Germany. Whereas prevailing conceptions of the Nazi movement pays little 
attention to pragmatic social and economic concerns, Brustein (1998) demonstrates that 
significant Nazi support existed at the intersection of large Protestant populations, high rates of 
unemployment, and a preponderance of lower-middle class families. In short, the Nazi 
movement was patterned by discernable and logical geography. Similarly, Parkin and colleagues 
(2015) use the distribution of Tea Party movement events to show that the structural incentives 
to Tea Party support are much more complicated than wealthy white families who resented 
increases in taxes.   
Despite these contributions, many established social movement researchers lament the 
paucity of information on ethnocentric white power movements and stress the need for additional 
empirical scholarship (McVeigh 1999; Blee 2013). Again, considerable academic rigor has been 
applied to progressive movements and both McVeigh (1999) and Blee (2013) speculate that, 
perhaps, the goals and rhetoric of ethnocentric movements deter academic interest to the 
detriment of social science. Yet, other areas of scholarship have explored white power groups – 
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though in unique ways – and from different angles. I turn now to the most prominent of these 
literatures, the criminological study of hate crime. 
Hate Crime 
The study of hate crime, which is commonly defined as words or actions intended to 
harm or intimidate an individual because of his/her perceived membership in or association with 
a particular group (Craig and Waldo 1996), is a relatively new and burgeoning literature. While 
broad in definition and encompassing a wide range of ideological motivations, the vast majority 
of the hate crime literature has been devoted to offenses involving racial bias, a focus that should 
be unsurprising given the centrality of race in American institutions (Bonilla-Silva 2003). The 
empirical study of anti-race hate crime has taken the form of both scholarship focusing on the 
individual perpetrators of hate crime as well as community-contextual research. 
Regarding the former, individual-level research emphasizes that hate crime functions 
differently than other crimes. For example, when comparing far-right homicides to common 
homicides, far-right offenders are more likely to be white, male, and acting in groups. Similarly, 
far-right homicide victims are more likely to be non-white, male, and have no previous 
relationship to the offender(s) (Gruenewald and Pridemore 2012). While homicide may be an 
extreme form of far-right criminality, such patterns largely mirror those of hate crime assault 
offenders and victims (Craig and Waldo 1996). These empirical results provide a stark contrast 
to common violent crimes in terms of the large racial disparity between offender and victim, the 
group nature of hate crime, and the stranger relationship between offender and victim 
(Gruenewald and Pridemore 2012).  
Regarding the latter research trajectory, the individual-level characteristics of hate crime 
often play out similarly on the aggregate-level, where hate crimes are seen as a tool of the 
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majority to keep minorities from threatening the established order (Corzine et al 1983; King 
2007; King et al 2009; Disha et al 2011; Beck and Tolnay 1990; King 2007). That is, hate crimes 
are intended to send a message to an opposing group rather than necessarily settling personal 
debts (Blalock 1956). Indeed, some of the earliest hate crime studies focused on lynching in the 
Reconstruction Era South and results from this line of work show lynchings to significantly 
increase where the black population is relatively large and the economic well-being of working-
class whites is most threatened. The implication of such findings suggests that the white 
community can feel sensitive about both the large black populace and the potential economic 
competition that black farmers may offer, both of which are seen as antagonistic to their own 
interests. A community with such tense undercurrents becomes a social powder keg: members of 
the white community will use whatever excuse presents itself to reassert their social and 
economic superiority, including lynchings (Blalock 1956; Beck and Tolnay 1990; Corzine et al 
1983).  
More recent studies of anti-race hate crime emphasize the threat to community identity, 
rather material competition or questions over social ascendancy. Several empirical studies show 
a correlation between hate crimes and the recent influx of non-whites into a homogenous and 
collectively efficacious white community (Lyons 2007, 2008; Grattet 2009; Green et al 1998a). 
The rhetoric for such community concerns may not be stated in explicitly racialized terms but 
several studies clearly indicate that a hostile defense of a community is clearly a racialized issue. 
As such, white residents commit anti-race hate crimes on community outsiders primarily out of a 
desire to enact perceived neighborhood sentiments on new non-white residents that do not fit the 
community identity (Lyons 2008). Likewise, other recent studies point to the strong correlation 
between elevated rates of hate crime and the presence of hate groups, regardless of the economic 
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condition of a given community (Adamczyk et al 2014; Mulholland 2013). Altogether, these 
studies indicate that hate crimes and inter-racial conflict cannot be completely encapsulated by 
socioeconomic reasons, and that collective identities are a significant part of the puzzle. 
 Overall then, the current study draws on the intersection of two separate but related 
literatures: (1) empirical research on social movements and (2) criminological scholarship 
focused on anti-race hate crime offending. On the one hand, social movements scholars have 
noted a shortage of empirical work devoted to ethnocentric race-based movements, especially as 
it regards the geographic distribution and correlates of white supremacist activities. On the other 
hand, criminologists working in the field of hate crime have studied such groups, but have 
focused almost entirely on the criminal outcomes that mark the most extreme end (i.e., the lethal 
hate crime) of the white supremacist movement. In contrast, social movements scholars would 
argue lethal violence is often the culmination of a long process that includes ideological 
reinforcement and resource mobilization, wherein context plays an important part. Yet, both 
literatures point to prominent sociological and criminological frameworks that guide 
expectations regarding the types of places in which white power support events are likely to 
occur. I turn to these theoretical lenses now. 
Theoretical Framework 
My goal in this section is to draw broadly from existing criminological and sociological 
theory at the macro-level, as well as note overlap with prominent movement framing 
perspectives, in order to generate expectations as to where white power groups are more or less 
likely to engage in support events. While white power social movements and hate crimes might 
not necessarily align in every instance in real life, prominent theoretical perspectives 
implemented in the sociological study of social problems broadly – and the hate crime literature 
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specifically – provide significant leverage in thinking about the geographic distribution of 
support events.  
Minority Group-Threat 
Minority group-threat is the understanding of hate crime as a function of the real and 
perceived encroachment of minority groups relative to the majority group (Corzine et al 1983). 
In its broadest form, minority group-threat theory emphasizes that discriminatory acts are 
expected to increase, as the relative size of a minority group increases because the majority feel 
that its power is eroding and, in turn, seek to re-exert dominance by implementing discriminatory 
policies and/or condone discriminatory acts perpetrated by citizens (Corzine et al 1983).  Though 
historically focused on tension between blacks and whites (Blalock 1956; Beck and Tolnay 
1990), others have extended this to include Latinos and other minorities, as well (Disha et al 
2011; Stacey et al 2011). 
 Minority group-threat has received substantial support over the years.  For example, 
Quillian (1995) notes the strength of group-threat theories is their ability to routinely capture 
levels of prejudice and discrimination such that the size of the racial minority population 
(especially the black population) has continually been shown to be a significant predictor of both 
discriminatory practices and hate crimes.  Likewise, Corzine et al (1983) finds that the number of 
lynchings increases substantially when black people comprise a large percentage of the 
population, while Disha, Cavendish, and King (2011) found areas with sizeable Muslim 
communities are the same areas most likely to experience anti-Muslim hate crime. Reflecting 
broadly on the most prominent themes of this theoretical perspective, Disha and colleagues point 
to an increasingly normalized “us versus them” approach to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, with a 
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significant spike in the number of people attacking Muslim communities in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks. 
 Understanding white power movements with a minority group-threat framework would 
then predict communities with larger racial or ethnic minority populations to be most likely to 
host white power organizations. Theoretically, the white majority could tacitly or explicitly 
endorse a white power movement if they thought the movement would ensure their economic, 
cultural, and political hegemony. Likewise, there is both real and symbolic value in white 
supremacist groups holding rallies or leafleting in more diverse locales: in such areas, racial 
minorities can be visibly proposed as a threat to the established white majority and rhetoric of 
white supremacy may resonate to a greater extent. That is, while the size of the racial minority 
population can pose a threat to white political power anywhere, an economic competition 
framework would point social movements research towards economically distressed areas with 
sizeable minority populations. In summary, minority group-threat would expect support for 
white power movements to be greatest in communities that are vying for political and economic 
ascendency with a significant minority population. 
Defended Neighborhoods 
As a closely related framework, the defended neighborhoods framework shares many 
similarities to minority group-threat. In this perspective, hate crime is still a function of inter-
group threat, but where minority group-threat finds hate crime in areas with large minority 
populations, defended neighborhoods argues that hate crimes are most likely when a 
predominately white community with strong informal ties experiences a recent, and relatively 
small, in-migration of racial outsiders. Such communities may be motivated to victimize racial 
minorities to defend white homogeneity from the threat posed by racial invasion (Lyons 2007). 
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 In contrast to minority threat models predicated on economic competition, defended 
neighborhood frameworks emphasize that there is no correlation between white unemployment 
or white economic strain and crime targeting minorities (Lyons 2008). Rather, defended 
neighborhoods suggest the most salient perceived threats are high levels of collective efficacy, 
social capital, or a sense of identity. Indeed, several qualitative studies paint a picture of young 
white men feeling as if they have the tacit consent of the community to target racial newcomers 
for acts of intimidation and prove themselves as “down with the program” of hating the 
appropriate enemies and idealizing the correct community identity (Grattet 2009). Quantitative 
examinations support such contentions: homogenous white communities with strong group 
cohesion experience a rise in hate crime when an influx of racial minorities reaches 
approximately 10 percent of the community’s population. Interestingly enough, homogenous 
white communities with low levels of collective efficacy experience no significant increase in 
hate crime regardless of the racial composition of the population influx (Grattet 2009). 
For the current study, defended neighborhoods would predict white power organizations 
to hold support events in more homogenously white neighborhoods with strong collective 
efficacy, rich in social capital, and a well-defined (white) identity that are experiencing relatively 
minor influx of racial minorities (Green et al 1998a, 1998b; Lyons 2007, 2008; Grattet 2009).  
The attractiveness of such places for white power rallies and leafleting rests more on their 
concern about the potential loss of identity and social capital than economic or political currency.  
As such, these communities, in dealing with small number of “racial invaders,” rather than a 
large minority population, may be more attractive locales for gathering movement support 
because the white power movement can then follow a stronghold approach (rather than minority 
group-threat’s emphasis on heterogeneous competition). The stronghold approach would imply 
12 
 
that the movement would ostensibly act as a vanguard organization to protect a bastion of white 
identity and collective efficacy.2 
Social Disorganization 
A social disorganization approach to hate crime provides a contrast from either of the two 
perspective above. Where defended neighborhoods are largely predicated on homogenous white 
neighborhoods with strong collective efficacy resisting the in-migration of minorities, social 
disorganization focuses on the breakdown of collective efficacy by widespread poverty, high 
residential mobility, and racial heterogeneity (the latter shared to some degree with minority 
group threat theory). Building on the early observations of the Chicago School of sociology, 
poverty, residential mobility, and racial heterogeneity are thought to collectively produce an 
environment with very little material or social capital that leads to a community’s lack of group 
cohesion (Shaw & McKay 1942). In turn, the breakdown in collective efficacy results in an 
inability of the community to achieve collective goals, such as the reduction of crime. Crime is, 
then, hypothesized to stem from a lack of informal social control. 
 For my purposes here, white power advocates may seize on the manifestation of social 
disorganization and the lack of informal control to rally support. Without social control, crime – 
both violent and nonviolent – is expected to flourish as local institutions fail to provide a check 
on criminal behavior. On the most serious end of the offense spectrum, a disorganized 
community is expected to experience hate crimes not as specific subsets of violent behavior, but 
as an integral portion of the overall violent criminal behavior in the neighborhood (Grattet 2009; 
Lyons 2007). Put simply, where hate crimes serve a specific purpose in otherwise crime-free 
                                                 
2 An additional relevant component of defended neighborhoods is that such strongholds of white 
identity provide a target-rich environment for white power activists. Even if concerns of a loss of 
community identity were removed from the social equation, the simple abundance of white 
people could itself provide a strategic rationale for holding white power events. 
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defended neighborhood contexts, they exist mostly as another facet of the violence-prone social 
landscape of socially disorganized areas. 
 The work of Lyons (2007) perhaps provides the best illustration of social 
disorganization’s utility. Pitting social disorganization against defended neighborhoods in 
examining the structural causes of hate crime, Lyons differentiates between anti-white and anti-
black hate crime and finds hate crime in general is correlated with both disorganization and 
defended neighborhoods structural variables. However, results differ by victim group: anti-white 
hate crime occurs most often in disorganized communities that experience high levels of other 
forms of violent crime, while anti-black hate crimes occur most often in organized, 
overwhelmingly white communities. 
 The theoretical value of social disorganization for this paper rests on its ability to explain 
the distribution of white power support events if they are more likely to occur in extremely 
racially diverse communities with no strong group attachment. The empirical support behind the 
increased likelihood of anti-white hate crimes might be serve as the central theme for white 
power framing: a white power organization can act as protectors for the under-siege whites 
(Lyons 2007). The racial and ethnic diversity of socially disorganized communities may leave 
whites as the racial minority, rendering them vulnerable to the rhetoric of organizations who 
champion white ascendency. A white power organization can offer the white populace a way out 
from criminal victimization and poverty and promise to restore them to their “proper” place in 
the racial hierarchy. A social disorganization approach to predicting white power support events 
would then point to poor, highly transient, racially diverse populations where a white power 




While not always geographically co-located, hate crime and white power social 
movements share similar geo-spatial theoretical underpinnings.  Hate crimes can and do exist 
without white power movements and vice versa; however, there remains a clear connection 
between a prevalence of anti-black hate crimes and the potential presence of a white power 
organization. Thus, the same underlying sentiment of racial intergroup conflict and community 
instability may drive both social phenomena. As outlined above, several of the most prominent 
hate crime theories imply that minority group presence should exacerbate inter-group tension in 
white communities with a sizeable racial minority population that actively competes with whites 
for economic and political advantage, increasing the likelihood for white power movement 
support events. Similarly, those communities with more deleterious social conditions and 
weakened collective efficacy (per social disorganization theory) could look to white power 
movements for relief and escape. Finally, homogenous white communities with greater 
collective efficacy (per defended neighborhoods) may be more likely to be chosen by white 
supremacist groups for rallies and leafleting given the impending influx of minorities into such 
locales.  
The synthesizing of multiple existing theoretical frameworks to explain largely 
reactionary social movements dovetails with the broader ‘power devaluation’ framework created 
to help explain reactionary social movements. McVeigh (1998) emphasized that losing power is 
not enough to spark a massive mobilization of resources, but that a reactionary social movement 
needs to frame the power devaluation in compelling terms and provide a clear agenda to rectify 
the grievance (McVeigh 2001, 2004). The frame alignment between the movement’s rhetoric and 
people’s reality plays a prominent role in determining where people are inclined to join a 
movement. In McVeigh’s original study, immigration, farm value, industrialization, and various 
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other variables predict Klan membership rates in Indiana during the 1920’s, the heyday of the Ku 
Klux Klan. Most of Indiana’s white Protestant middle-class likely experienced some sort of loss 
in terms of economic or political exchange but not all suffered to the same degree. The 
difference in degree significantly affected the successful framing of Klan rhetoric (McVeigh 
1999). For instance, a county with a rise in immigration but with robust agricultural production is 
not as likely to mobilize for the Klan’s rhetoric of the plight of struggling farmers as in places 
with both immigration and weak agricultural production. 
Attempting to emulate McVeigh’s multifaceted approach, I use the criminological 
theories of place outlined as they dovetail with the broader power devaluation framework. 
Instead of solely relying on a single theory to explain white power group involvement, each 
theory of place can be used concurrently to capture a more complete picture of white power 
activity. That is, each theory separately captures the macro-structural correlates of white power 
support while, collectively, complementing each other. 
The Current Study 
Recall, the two key research questions for the current study are: (1) How are white power 
support events (rallies, leafleting, and protests) geographically distributed? and (2) What are the 
macro-structural correlates of white power support events? Below, I describe the key sources of 
data, operationalization of key measures, and analytic techniques employed to address these 
questions. 
Sources of Data 
Data for the current project are drawn from three key sources. First, information on white 
power social movement support events for the years 2012-2015 are taken from the Southern 
Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) Hate Watch database. An organization was considered to be a part 
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of the white power or white supremacist movement if the group publicly advocated for any form 
of white empowerment, white separatism, white nationalism, or white supremacy (SPLC 
Extremist Files served as a guide). While the SPLC publishes quarterly reports of hate group 
support activity in the United States, along with notable hate crimes that have been reported, 
several researchers note the limitations and vulnerabilities of using SPLC data (Freilich 2003; 
Kaplan 1997; Mulholland 2013). Regardless, the SPLC remains a valuable resource if only for 
its virtual monopoly on the publicly available information on American far-right groups. These 
data were constrained to include only events for each year that fell under the categories of 
leafleting and rallies (protests were included under rallies in these data) and totaled 103 events 
for these years. 
As a second source of data, additional events for the 2012-2015 period were culled from 
news articles contained in the LexisNexis Academic databases.3  Following prior research 
(Adamczyk et al 2014), I constructed a list of search terms with which to search for articles from 
local and regional media sources.  All articles were included that contained the terms “rally,” 
“leaflet,” “speech,” “protest,” “counter-protest,” or “demonstration,” as well as at least one of the 
following terms: “hate group,” “white supremacist,” “anti-race,” “Ku Klux Klan,” “Aryan,” 
“Neo-Nazi,” “skinhead,” “white nationalist,” or “anti-immigrant.”4 These search terms yielded 
2,888 news articles from which I was able to identify an additional 45 events beyond those 
collected from the SPLC database. At the same time, this second database also provided a means 
of verifying the SPLC data in that many events were recorded in both sources.   
                                                 
3 Alternatively, similar searches in Google News archives did not produce substantially 
different results. 
4 Additional search terms for more specific white supremacist movements (e.g., Odinism, 
Christian Identity, etc.) were employed in supplemental searches.  However, the addition of these 
more specific terms did not yield any additional articles than in the terms listed here.  As such, I 
utilized the more parsimonious filter for the final sample. 
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Third, I pair the white power event data with macro-structural characteristics drawn from 
the United States Census and American Community Survey (ACS) for the year 2010. It should 
be noted that the community data is lagged several years behind the white power movement 
support events in order to provide appropriate temporal ordering. 
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for the current study is the county, which has a number of 
advantages. First, white power rallies and leafleting are relatively rare and counties (a) capture 
enough of these rare events to provide meaningful analysis while also (b) allowing for the 
inclusion of the full range of structural covariates. While some have suggested focusing on 
specific communities rather than counties for extremist activity (Fitzpatrick et al. 2016), the 
result is a narrower geographic focus with fewer events. Second, while Census tracts may (or 
may not) be optimal for the community-driven hate crime frameworks, the SPLC Hate Watch 
Reports list incidents by county but rarely, if ever, list the exact location of the incident by 
neighborhood or town/city. The Lexis-Nexis media articles suffer from the same limitation.  As 
such, counties represent the smallest unit of analysis for my outcome of interest given the 
sources of data employed in the current study. Third, counties allow for the inclusion of more 
rural communities that would be absent in analyses using metropolitan statistical areas, census 
tracts, or other urban-centric geographic units. 
Dependent Variables 
The current study utilizes two dependent variables. First, I record whether a county had a 
white power rally or leafleting event during the years 2012-2015 as tracked in either the SPLC or 
open source media data (dummy variable with presence of event coded as 1). Second, I capture 
whether a county had either of two types of events (again, coded as dummy variables: rallies or 
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leafletting events. The purpose of these latter two variables is to disaggregate the overall 
presence of white supremacist support into two of the most prevalent forms it takes in face-to-
face rallies and more impersonal leafleting. 
Key Independent Variables 
The independent variables in this study are informed by existing empirical research and 
both the hate crime and social movement theories outlined earlier. Building on Shaw and 
McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory, I include variables for residential mobility, 
measured as the percent of the population who have moved within the same county in the past 
year. Racial and ethnic minority, calculated as percent of the population that is non-white (a 
variable that each theoretical frameworks shares), is used as a measure of racial and ethnic 
heterogeneity as defined by prior research (Beck & Tolnay 1990; Corzine et al 1983; Disha et al 
2011). A disadvantage factor (encompassing percent of the population below the poverty line, 
percent of households headed by a female with children under eighteen, and percent of the 
population unemployed) is used to mitigate problematic multicollinearity often associated with 
multiple measures of socioeconomic disadvantage. The three component variables provided a 
factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.10, well above the accepted threshold of 1.00, indicating that the 
factor provides value as a composite over the individual measures and explains approximately 70 
percent of the shared variance among the three measures. 
Additionally, I tap into minority group-threat by including foreign born, operationalized 
as the percent of the population born outside the United States. Specifically, this measure is 
intended to tap into the salience of foreign born Hispanics (Parkin et al 2015) and foreign born 
Muslims (Disha et al 2011) as engendering group threat. Republican voting, measured as votes 
for John McCain in the 2008 Presidential election, is included as measure of political 
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competition (Corzine et al 1983). It is expected that traditionally socially conservative areas will 
be most sensitive to an increasing racial/ethnic minority population (King et al 2009).  
 Finally, while defended neighborhoods still utilizes the racial and ethnic minority 
variable, it also posits a negative relationship such that predominately white neighborhoods 
“defend” themselves from minority encroachment, especially in more affluent contexts (Green et 
al 1998; Lyons 2008). As such, I include median household income (logged) as a way to examine 
these well-off and collective efficacious white neighborhoods (Lyons 2008). 
Basic Demographic and Geographic Controls 
In addition to the substantive variables listed above, several demographic variables are 
also included as controls for the statistical models. Percent of the population living in an urban 
area and the population density (logged) are included to account for the tendency for many social 
events to occur in more populous and densely inhabited locales. Finally, geographic region is 
also controlled for using dummies for the Northeast, Midwest, and West region (South is the 
reference) to capture any regional effects.  
Methods 
 I begin my analysis by, first, providing descriptive statistics for those counties that have 
experienced a white power movement event as compared to those counties that have not. The 
goal here is to describe the overall distribution of white power events (including a geo-spatial 
map) and the essential characteristics of those counties that have and have not had a rally or 
leafleting event occur. Second, I examine a correlation matrix of the major independent variables 
that will be employed in subsequent multivariate models with specific attention to the 
identification of any variable groupings that might be collinear and/or require dimension 
reduction through a factor analysis. At the same time, the correlations also provide some initial 
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insight into which socio-structural characteristics are associated with support events and which 
are not. 
Third, I construct multivariate regression models predicting each of the dependent 
variables described above. The methodological approach largely hinges on the rarity of white 
power movement events: between 2012 and 2015 less than 4 percent of counties experienced 
such an event (see descriptive statistics below). Given the binary nature of the dependent 
variables and the rarity of social movement events, I employ penalized maximum-likelihood 
logistic regression. Advocated by King and Zeng (2001), these models correct for the 
underestimation of rare events that typical regression cannot by generating approximately 
unbiased variance estimates of logit coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix (see also 
Adamczyk et al 2014).  
Finally, as a supplement to these primary models predicting whether an event occurred or 
not, negative binomial regressions are constructed in order to predict the number (count) of white 
power events in those counties in which at least one occurred.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 To begin, Figure 1 geo-locates all counties that had at least one white supremacist 
support event for the time period. Figure 1 thus allows the distribution of events to be visually 
examined for specific patterns and to contextualize where they have taken place in recent years.  
(FIGURE 1 HERE) 
I note the following. First, white power movement events are more prevalent in some regions 
(e.g., the South) than in others (e.g., the West or mountain regions). That is, as a whole, white 
supremacist groups are more likely to hold rallies or distribute leaflets in some areas of the 
country than in others. Second, there are clusters of events that roughly correspond with (a) the 
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Black Belt, a sub-region within the South known for its historically large black population, and 
(b) large metropolitan areas in the northeast and heartland of the United States (e.g., Philadelphia 
metropolitan area, New Jersey, Pittsburgh, and Kansas City). As such, the takeaway from Figure 
1 is that there appears to be significant regional variation in the prevalence of white power rallies 
and leafleting. 
Turning to the descriptive statistics of the sample, Table 1 provides break downs of the 
key variables (means and standard deviations) for those counties experiencing a white power 
support event (N = 119) and those that have not (N = 3,020). The focus here is on the difference 
in mean values for the focal independent variables across both groups. I find the following. 
(TABLE 1 HERE) 
First, and most notably, the counties that experience an event have higher mean 
proportion of their populations comprised of racial and ethnic minorities and are more densely 
populated, urban locales (as well as places with slightly larger foreign born populations) than 
non-event counties. For example, the mean percent minority in event counties is 24.7 but only 
20.0 in counties with no white supremacist support events. Counties with events are also more 
residentially mobile (8.9 versus 7.1 percent mobility) and have more female-headed households 
(7.7 versus 6.6), but have slightly less poverty than non-event counties (13.6 versus 15.0). 
Unemployment, Republican voting, and median household income vary to lesser degrees – that 
is, counties in which white supremacist support events occurred had similar employment, voting, 
and income patterns as those where no events occurred. 
 Second, there is considerably more variation across counties among those that did not 
have a white power support event as compared to those that did. Indeed, for every measure 
included in Table 1, all of the standard deviations were larger for the sample of non-event 
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counties than the event counties (despite the larger sample size for non-event counties). In short, 
there is greater similarity among the group of counties for which a white supremacist event 
occurred than in the other counties in the United States. 
As an instructive next step, Table 2 displays the correlation matrix of key variables. Here, 
the emphasis is on the one-to-one association between white power support events and each of 
the focal independent variables. I note, first, that with the exceptions of the disadvantage factor, 
Republican voting, and the percent foreign born, all variables have a statistically significant 
association (and in the positive direction) with white power support events. In short, counties 
with higher median household incomes, more minorities, greater population density, more 
residential mobility, and with more people living in an urban area are more likely to have a white 
power support event take place within them. White power support events have the strongest 
correlation with population density and urbanicity with scores of .220 and .174, respectively, 
while the percent racial/ethnic minority has a statistically significant bivariate relationship with 
white power events that is weaker (r = .052). 
(TABLE 2 HERE) 
 Second, multicollinearity does not seem to be an issue, especially with the inclusion of 
the disadvantage factor in lieu of the disaggregated variables. Disadvantage shares a moderate 
correlation with percent racial/ethnic minority (r =.532), though additional diagnostics for the 
multivariate models below confirm multicollinearity is not a problem (see below). Likewise, the 
percentage of the population living in an urban area and population density share a correlation of 




 The goal now is to examine the macro-structural predictors most strongly associated with 
the likelihood of a white power support event taking place, controlling for all other macro-social 
characteristics simultaneously. To that end, Table 3 presents the results from the penalized 
maximum likelihood logistic regression results for the nation as a whole and then broken down 
into Northeast, Midwest, South, and West regions. As Figure 1 demonstrated above, regional 
variation appears to be a prominent feature of white power support events and the penalized 
logistic regression models have been formatted to accommodate for such variation. 
(TABLE 3 HERE) 
 The results of the nationwide regression models presented in the first column find, first, 
that median household income, Republican voting, residential mobility, and population density 
all significantly increase the odds of a white power event taking place. Specifically, residential 
mobility and Republican voting marginally increase the odds of an event by 1.8 percent and 14.9 
percent, respectively (OR=1.018, p<.05 and OR=1.149, p<.001, respectively). In contrast, a one 
unit increase in logged population density results in a nearly doubling of the odds of an event 
taking place (OR=1.721, p<.001). Likewise, a one unit increase in logged median household 
income yields 4.5 times greater odds of a white power support event occurring (OR=4.497, 
p<.05). Interestingly, the percent foreign born decreases the odds of an event by around 8 percent 
(OR=.920, p<.01), while disadvantage, percent racial/ethnic minority, and urbanicity are all 
statistically unassociated with the likelihood of a white supremacist rally or leafleting event 
taking place. Taken as a whole, the nationwide results suggest that more populous, well-off, 
traditionally conservative, and residentially mobile counties with a smaller foreign-born 
population are more likely to host white power social movement events. Interestingly, given the 
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nonsignificant variables, these locales are more populous without necessarily being urban areas, 
or places with larger/smaller racial/ethnic minority populations. 
 Turning to the region-specific models (columns 2-4), I find, second, that there is 
considerable variation across regions as to the predictors of white power movement events. That 
is, there are unique socio-structural predictors of the likelihood of a white supremacist support 
event across different areas of the country. For example, within the Northeast region (and in 
stark contrast to the nationwide results), the relative size of the racial/ethnic minority population 
is positively and statistically significantly associated with the odds of a white power event 
(OR=1.137, p<.05), as is population density (OR=1.914, p<.01). In contrast, among counties in 
the Midwest, only Republican voting (OR=1.064, p<.05) and population density (OR=2.461, 
p<.01) are significant predictor of white power events, while the southern counties are more 
likely to experience an event as median income (OR=7.441, p<.05), residential mobility 
(OR=1.149, p<.01), and population density (OR=1.449, p<.001) increase. Finally, the West’s 
only significant predictor of the odds of a white supremacist movement event is population 
density (OR=2.094, p<.05).  
 Overall, the regional results paint a complex picture. Population density is the only 
variable that consistently and significantly increases the odds of a white power support event. 
Outside of that, the aggregate nationwide results largely miss the regional complexities of where 
white power movements direct their efforts (i.e., where they hold rallies or distribute leaflet 
materials). The percent racial/ethnic minority is only significantly associated in the Northeast, for 
example, whereas median household income increases the odds of an event only in the South 
(thus driving the effect of median income for the nation as a whole). Put simply, the nationwide 




 As a supplement for the logistic regression, I now estimate a series of negative binomial 
regression models predicting the number of events for those counties that had at least one. 
Results are provided in Table 4. The shift in dependent variables from the penalized logistic 
regression (predicting whether any event occurred) to negative binomial models (predicting the 
number of events that occurred) is strategic in that I am now examining whether certain 
structural characteristics are associated with a greater/lower number of movement events. The 
negative binomial results are broken down into event type to examine the contextual features of 
both rallies and leaflets together (column 1), rallies alone (column 2), and leaflets alone (column 
3). The key finding is that, across all three categories, the percentage of the population that is 
foreign born, population density, and urbanicity are all significantly associated with fewer 
numbers of white power support events. These three variables are also the only significant 
variables, with the exception of residential mobility for the leaflets only category. In short, places 
with more foreign born persons, greater population density, and more people living in urban 
areas have fewer white supremacist support (among those counties with at least some white 
power activity). 
(TABLE 4 HERE) 
 In summary, the negative binomial results complement the logistic regression results 
whereby the size of the foreign-born population is negatively associated with the odds of an 
event and the overall number of events. Similarly, both models agree on the primacy of 
population density, though the opposing directions of the relationship (positive for logistic, 
negative for negative binomial) deserve attention. In conjunction, the two sets of models would 
suggest that counties that are more densely populated are more likely to have at least one event, 
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but that the chances for repeated events are reduced as density increases. Plainly, white power 
rallies and leafleting are expected to both occur and reoccur in small to mid-sized population 
centers with small foreign born communities.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Using three years’ worth of Southern Poverty Law Center and Lexis-Nexis data to find 
white power movement events conjoined with demographic data from the American Community 
Survey, this study examined the macro-structural characteristics associated with rallies and 
leafleting in support of the contemporary white power movement in the United States. 
Connecting previous research in both the hate crime and social movement literature, my goal has 
been to understand where white power organizations hold rallies and distribute leaflets. My 
primary findings were, first, that rallies and leafleting events by white power organizations are 
geographically widespread. Where white power events are stereotypically expected to be 
concentrated in relatively limited areas (i.e., the South or the proverbial “backwoods”), this study 
found white power events in 35 states that ranged from small, rural towns to large, metropolitan 
areas. The results would indicate that the scope and breadth of the contemporary white power 
movement in America is much larger, and more complex, than is often acknowledged.  
Second, I found that certain structural factors of communities influence the likelihood of 
a white power movement event happening. Looking at the nation as a whole, communities were 
more likely to have a white power movement event if the community was a medium-sized town, 
wealthy, traditionally conservative, residentially mobile, and lacking a foreign-born population. 
Despite the belief that white power activists function only on the margins of society (Futrell & 
Simi 2004), the results of this study would indicate that white power activists make concerted 
efforts to engage mainstream conservative communities.  
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Third, I found that white power mobilization varies widely by region. For example, the 
percent racial/ethnic minority mattered only in the Northeast, whereas median household income 
only mattered in the South. That is, communities with greater numbers of racial and ethnic 
minorities were more likely to have rallies or leafleting events in the Northeast, whereas events 
in the South were more likely to occur in wealthier communities regardless of racial/ethnic 
composition. Clearly this would suggest that white power mobilization does not conform to a 
national standard or particular set of criteria. The regional results, then, would temper the 
national results by indicating that the real story is unfolding in highly localized attempts to sell 
white power rhetoric.  
While white power mobilization is seemingly quite atomized, the regional results still 
present probable findings given the characteristics of each region. The salience of percent 
racial/ethnic minority in the Northeast makes sense given that New York City and Boston are 
major immigration hubs. The larger numbers of immigrants likely provide more exposure to 
racial and ethnic minorities, along with the corresponding political points to be gained from real 
(or imagined) racial tensions. Similarly, the salience of conservative voting in the Midwest may 
reflect the conservative-leaning social concerns that are often associated with Midwestern farm 
country. The large effect of median household income in the South could be an attempt to 
capitalize on the prejudices (and resources) of the moneyed Southern communities.   
Collectively, all the theoretical frameworks incorporated into this study provided some 
leverage for understanding how sentiments of threat in some contexts might translate to 
movement outcomes. For example, the relative size of the minority population in the Northeast 
was linked to a greater likelihood of an event occurring (consistent with minority group threat), 
whereas wealthier white counties across the nation and in the South were similarly linked to 
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greater likelihood of rallies and leafleting (per the defended neighborhoods framework)5. 
Likewise, the statistical significance of residential mobility (nationally and in the South) 
provided some support for the social disorganization framework, despite the relative non-
significance of socioeconomic disadvantage across the board. Meanwhile, Republican voting 
(nationally and the Midwest) was linked to greater likelihood of support events, demonstrating 
that feelings of threat manifested through conservative political action also increased the 
likelihood of white supremacist support events when all other macro-structural characteristics 
were held constant. 
 While there is some support for each of the theoretical frameworks, none independently 
explain the geographic distribution of the white power mobilization alone; indeed, the national-
level results paint a picture of white power activists attempting to graft their own ideology onto 
existing socially conservative populations by harnessing already existing sentiments of social 
threat. By focusing on medium-sized towns that are traditional Republican strongholds, wealthy, 
residentially mobile, and more bereft of foreign born individuals, white power activists seem to 
follow the traditional path to success that most other right-wing movements have taken in the 
United States. Similar movements have emphasized the “American Heartland” model of 
movement mobilization (that is, white and non-urban) with the Tea Party (Parkin et al 2015) and 
the Klu Klux Klan (McVeigh 1999) being notable examples.  
At the same time, the degree of regional variation observed in the current study paints a 
much more complicated picture on the local level, one perhaps best explained by the decidedly 
grassroots organization of most white power movements. As other scholars have noted (Futrell & 
                                                 
5 For the sake of ideological purity, I tested for a threshold effect on the percent racial/ethnic 
minority. Prior research on defended neighborhoods (Lyons 2008) indicates that threat primarily 
manifests during the initial influx of community outsiders. Statistical analysis conclude that no 
such threshold effect influences the incidences of white power movement events. 
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Simi 2004), contemporary white power organizations often invoke a decentralized organizational 
practice, for reasons that often blend concerns of security with pragmatic movement success. 
Principally, the overarching necessity for decentralizing is the current political atmosphere that 
“criminalizes” white power ideologies: the stigma of white power not only reduces activists to 
“wackos of the fringe” but also invites investigation and infiltration by law enforcement (Futrell 
& Simi 2004). White power organizations thereby respond with decentralized power structures 
in order to contain any breaches by law enforcement: independent cells can be compromised 
without compromising the entire organization.  
More central to the results of this study, decentralized, grassroots movements have 
pragmatic applications outside of security concerns: namely the adaptability of local, grassroots 
activists to match ideology and resource acquisition to surrounding contextual features. As white 
power activists mobilize on their own accord within their own communities, they have the 
benefit of molding their message to the concerns of the local citizens. A high-ranking member of 
a white power organization explicitly supported such notions of local activism by saying, “Our 
agenda is to organize people to campaign in LOCAL elections, and build a power base across the 
country that eventually can lead to real-world power.” (original emphasis, personal 
correspondence, May 3, 2016). Other contemporary right-wing movements have been similarly 
observed to hold preferences for grassroots activism, with ethnographic analysis of the English 
Defense League, an anti-Muslim movement group in England, perhaps providing the best 
parallel (Taylor et al 2013: 65-81). Such small-scale activism can explain why specific 
contextual features matter more or less across different regions of the United States – that is, why 
larger populations of racial or ethnic minorities can be vital to white power mobilization in the 
Northeast, median household income in the South, and traditional Republican voting in the 
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Midwest. Plainly, each local chapter of white power activists are making strategic decisions as to 
which features of their context they need to capitalize on and/or which specific demographic sub-
groups are most vulnerable to white power rhetoric. 
Support from Qualitative Data 
Indeed, a more qualitative analysis of the data collected from this project demonstrates 
that white power appeals for social support largely fall into two complementary categories: (1) 
opportunistic activism based on a relevant and heavily-covered media events or (2) appeals to a 
given white community framed by recent demographic shifts. As an example of the first, the 
communities beset by media coverage of the shootings of Trayvon Martin in Florida and Martin 
Brown in Missouri saw white supremacist rallies and leafleting within the data (and time period) 
collected for the current study. These racially-charged events were interpreted by white power 
activists to be prime moments to emphasize white racial solidarity, largely by white power 
groups offering to protect white communities from any form of retaliation by perceived racial 
enemies. Local white power groups made their presence known in both situations by offering 
small rallies and distributing literature to white communities, but even distant white power 
groups saw the rhetorical potential of the event and distributed their own literature about 
protecting white communities from perceived threats. 
Regarding the second category, without the benefit of media-relevant events, white 
power activists appear to focus on demographic shifts and the potential threat they pose. Notably, 
the 2013 National Socialist Movement rally in Odessa, Texas was explicitly meant to draw 
attention to the plight of white communities in the face of a perceived influx of Hispanic 
immigrants. According the American Community Survey, the metro population of Odessa 
increased by 8,000 residents between the years of 2010 to 2013, 7,000 of which were Hispanic. 
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While this ostensibly confirms the rhetoric of the National Socialist Movement, whether this 
demographic shift actually harmed the white community is more likely an issue of perception, 
rather than demography. Taken together, white power groups tend to focus on broad national 
support when highlighting a heavily-covered media event, but tend to focus on much more local 
concerns when left to their own propaganda skills.  
Limitations and Future Research  
Overall, this study provides some insight into the mobilization strategies that 
contemporary white power organizations make in their day-to-day operation. Undoubtedly, this 
study is not without limitations and consequent avenues for future research. Most glaringly, this 
study is not a true longitudinal examination of the greater white power movement. A larger 
sample and extended demographic information would provide greater leverage in determining if 
specific macro-structural features attract the white power movement, particularly how they 
grow/shrink with broader community changes. There are also notable gaps in media coverage 
that could be mitigated in future research. The LexisNexis news articles used to locate white 
power events come from relatively large newspapers, leaving some of the more remote areas 
potentially absent from this study if their papers did not contribute to the LexisNexis database (or 
did not record the events at all). Relatedly, other types of white power events are missing 
entirely. For example, attempts at locating hate rock concerts, a popular social event for white 
power skinheads, have been difficult to complete given their sporadic performances and the lack 
of any real infrastructure for concern planning. 
This study assumes that movement support is primarily the result of pragmatic and 
rational decisions directed toward the costs and benefits of white power goals. However, recent 
social movement scholarship has highlighted the importance of collective identity that may 
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outweigh material concerns. Collective identity is, undoubtedly, a crucial factor of mobilization, 
but quantifying collective identity lies beyond the scope of the current study. Interviews or 
qualitative examinations of white power rhetoric employed in conjunction with contextual 
factors would add significantly to extant literature in this regard. Likewise, comparisons of white 
power groups across countries could help to further determine what global trends are leading to a 
rise in white power activity, both in the United States and Europe.  
The number of far-right groups is on the rise both in the United States and across Europe, 
with a corresponding increase ethnocentric rhetoric (SPLC Hatewatch 2012; Veugelers 1997). 
As the world continues to struggle with the economic inequality and demographic changes of 
globalization, far-right groups will only continue to grow. Understanding the structural factors of 
where ethnocentric movements draw support could help stabilize the communities most 
susceptible to far-right rhetoric. The current study provided some answers to how ethnocentric 
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Table 1. Descriptives of Key Variables by County 
    
   
  
Experienced an Event 
 
No Event 
    Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
Independent Variables: 










































      










       









Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Key Variables 
          
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(1) White Power Event 1.000 
        
(2) Disadvantage Index .014 ^ 1.000 
       
(3) Med. Household Inc. (ln) .102 -.585 1.000 
      
(4) Republican Voting -.008 ^ -.054 -.130 1.000 
     
(5) Racial/Ethnic Minority .052 .532 -.188 -.038 ^ 1.000 
    
(6) Foreign Born .033 ^ -.051 .252 -.058 .365 1.000 
   
(7) Population Density (ln) .220 .158 .308 -.223 .170 .078 1.000 
  
(8) Residential Mobility .118 .201 .006 ^ .003 ^ .136 .076 .347 1.000 
 
(9) Urbanicity .174 .014 ^ .373 -.145 .220 .238 .628 .523 1.000 
 
                  
Note: ^ not significant at p<.01 









Table 3. Penalized Maximum Likelihood Logistic Regression Models Predicting White Power Support 
Events for the United States as a Whole and By Census Region  
       
   
Regional Models 
  Nation   Northeast Midwest South West 
Independent Variables: 
      Disadvantage Index 1.020  .196 1.310 .977 1.157 
 
(.175) 
 (.194) (.426) (.220) (.765) 
Median Household Income (ln) 4.497*  .040 .666 7.441* 7.002 
 
(3.234) 
 (.127) (1.394) (6.636) (15.141) 
Republican Voting 1.018* 
 




(.027) (.026) (.010) (.027) 
Racial/ethnic Minority 1.005 
 




(.063) (.038) (.011) (.052) 
Foreign Born .920** 
 




(.072) (.094) (.032) (.084) 
Residential Mobility 1.149*** 
 




(.176) (.112) (.060) (.179) 
Demographic Controls: 
      Population Density (ln) 1.721*** 
 




(.439) (.767) (.163) (.776) 
Urbanicity  1.014 
 




(.026) (.039) (.014) (.052) 
       N 3,139   251 1,055 1,421 421 
Note: Odds ratios are presented with standard errors in parentheses for ease of interpretation. 
 * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 





Table 4. Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting the Number of White Power Support Events for the United 
States as a Whole (N=119) 
     
         (1) All Events (2) Rallies (3) Leaflets 
Independent Variables: 
    Disadvantage Index 
 
.954 .840 1.007 
  
(.104) (.227) (.337) 
Median Household Income (ln) 
 
.877 .851 .804 
  
(.298) (.681) (.337) 
Republican Voting 
 
.998 .990 .997 
  
(.004) (.007) (.004) 
Racial/ethnic Minority 
 
1.004 1.007 1.001 
  
(.006) (.012) (.005) 
Foreign Born 
 
.943*** .935** .953*** 
  
(.011) (.024) (.012) 
Residential Mobility 
 
.965 1.021 .941* 
  
(.029) (.043) (.024) 
Control Variables 
    Population Density (ln) 
 
.651*** .677** .636*** 
  
(.035) (.090) (.045) 
Urbanicity  
 
.974** .947*** .982*** 
  
(.008) (.010) (.005) 
          
Note: All models include an exposure term for the total population in each county and are estimated with standard errors clustered by state.  Incident rate 
ratios are displayed for comparability to the logistic models in prior tables. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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